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Three	lessons	from	the	Czech	presidential	election
Miloš	Zeman	won	a	second	term	as	Czech	President	on	27	January,	narrowly	defeating	opposition
candidate	Jiří	Drahoš.	Jan	Rovny	writes	that	the	country	is	now	sharply	divided	between	two	political
blocs	that	cut	across	old	left-right	allegiances,	with	identity	politics	playing	an	increasingly	important	role
in	shaping	support.	The	presidential	election	also	underlined	that	Czech	politics	is	likely	to	take	another
step	closer	to	Poland	and	Hungary,	but	with	the	key	distinction	that	the	country’s	liberal	opposition	has
shown	an	ability	to	unite	against	Zeman	and	garner	almost	50%	of	the	vote.
Miloš	Zeman	speaking	at	the	European	Parliament,	Credit:	©	European	Union	2014	–	European	Parliament	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
The	2018	Czech	presidential	election	concluded	on	27	January	with	the	reelection	of	Miloš	Zeman	by	a	relatively
narrow	margin	of	51.4%	to	48.6%	in	the	second	round	of	voting.	The	first	round	results,	returning	lower	scores	for
Zeman	than	expected,	infused	his	younger,	mostly	urban,	opponents	with	high	hopes	of	sending	Jiří	Drahoš,	the
counter-candidate,	to	Prague	Castle.
The	incumbent	Zeman,	a	self-styled	representative	of	the	common	folk,	who	peppers	his	speeches	with	occasional
profanities	while	cozying	up	to	Moscow	and	Beijing,	did	not	formally	campaign	largely	due	to	ill	health.	However,	in
the	context	of	a	complicated	government	formation	process	after	the	October	2017	parliamentary	election,	Zeman
often	appeared	in	the	media	as	a	political	broker.	An	effective	campaign	was	run	by	parties	close	to	him,	by	his
supporters,	and	his	advisors.
Drahoš,	a	political	outsider	coming	from	the	Academy	of	Sciences	which	he	led	in	the	past,	based	his	campaign	on
the	promise	to	return	dignity	to	the	presidential	office,	and	to	reassert	the	Czech	Republic	as	a	modern	democracy
anchored	in	the	European	Union	and	NATO.	The	polls	suggested	a	neck-and-neck	contest,	and	the	two	presidential
debates	in	the	days	prior	to	the	second	round	were	closely	observed	for	Drahoš’s	ability	to	withstand	Zeman’s
renowned	unscrupulous	wit,	and	Zeman’s	ability	to	stand	the	physical	strain.
But	despite	the	excitement	of	a	final	campaign	marked	by	nail-bitting	uncertainty,	and	despite	the	great
disappointment	of	the	Czech	liberals	who	were	hoping	to	demonstrate	that	central	Europe	can	break	the	populist
spell	and	elect	a	pro-European	leader,	this	tight	election	would	have	entailed	the	same	lessons	had	Drahoš	carried
the	day.	The	contest	demonstrated	three	important	developments	in	Czech	politics	that	resonate	far	beyond	the
small	country,	and	far	beyond	central	Europe.
Building	blocks
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The	presidential	election	underscores	the	formation	of	two	blocks	in	Czech	politics.	These	blocks	draw	together
electorates	and	bind	some	seemingly	odd	bedfellows	among	political	parties.	The	anti-Zeman	block	combines:	the
established	conservative	party	ODS,	the	historical	Christian	democrats	(KDU-ČSL),	the	more	recently	founded	right-
wing	TOP09,	and	the	political	novices	—	the	party	of	mayors	(STAN),	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	the	Pirate	party.
This	is	a	very	diverse	group	that	ranges	from	social	liberals	(Pirates)	to	religious	conservatives	(KDU-ČSL),	from
economic	centrists	(KDU-ČSL)	to	staunch	neo-liberals	(ODS),	from	Euro-enthusiasts	(KDU-ČSL)	to	profound
Eurosceptics	(ODS),	from	entrenched	parties	with	long	governing	experience	(ODS)	to	populist	upstarts	(Pirates).
What	unites	this	camp	is	their	opposition	to	Zeman,	his	political	style,	as	well	as	his	geopolitical	orientation	towards
the	east.	The	parties	in	this	block	tend	to	be	supported	either	by	the	urban	educated	(Pirates),	the	wealthier	(ODS,
TOP09),	or	the	religious	(KDU-ČSL).
The	second	block,	defined	by	support	for	Zeman,	brings	together	the	less	educated,	poorer,	secular,	and	rural
voters.	These	are	the	electorates	of	the	historical	Communist	party	(KSČM),	as	well	as	of	a	recent	radical	right
challenger	(SPD),	and,	increasingly,	of	the	populist	ANO	—	the	party	of	the	oligarch,	Andrej	Babiš,	that	won	the	2017
parliamentary	elections	in	October,	and	has	been	struggling	to	form	a	government	since.
ANO’s	placement	in	this	camp	has	been	unclear.	At	its	debut	in	2011,	and	in	the	2013	parliamentary	elections,	ANO
presented	itself	as	the	right-wing	party	of	a	‘successful	businessman,’	and	largely	drew	from	the	voters	of	the
conservative	ODS.	In	a	previous	post,	I	described	their	2017	strategy	as	purely	populist,	rejecting	any	meaningful
aggregation	of	political	proposals,	and	defying	any	comprehensible	political	labelling.	The	strategy	brought	them
many	less	affluent	and	less	educated	voters	on	the	left.	In	this	presidential	election,	first	the	leader	Babiš,	and	finally
the	party	as	an	organisation	endorsed	Zeman,	thus	openly	declaring	their	left-wing,	nationalist	affinities	typified	by
Zeman.	In	the	long	run,	ANO	will	face	difficulties	in	marrying	their	original	right-wing	electorate	with	the	support	of
traditional	Zeman	voters.
Interestingly,	the	social	democratic	party	(ČSSD),	unseated	from	its	government	position	in	the	2017	parliamentary
elections	by	ANO,	stands	between	the	blocks.	The	party	is	torn	between	its	social	democratic	legacy	implying	some
cultural	openness	and	pro-European	orientation	on	the	one	hand,	and	its	dwindling	electorate	of	the	poorer,	and	less
educated,	who	are	drawn	to	Zeman’s	nationalist	discourse	and	brutish	demeanour,	as	well	as	to	the	other	parties	of
the	pro-Zeman	block.	While	its	previous	leader	and	ex-prime	minister,	Bohuslav	Sobotka,	publicly	supported	Drahoš,
the	current	interim	leader,	Milan	Chovanec,	spoke	out	in	favour	of	Zeman.	The	presidential	election	thus	emphasised
the	ongoing	battle	for	the	soul	and	survival	of	the	party.
Intruding	identity
The	rise	of	block	politics,	coupling	seemingly	odd	bed	fellows,	such	as	the	Communists	and	the	radical	right,	or	the
Christian	Democrats	and	the	Pirates,	redefines	the	orientations	of	Czech	politics.	My	previous	research	has
demonstrated	(see	here	and	here)	that	political	competition	in	the	Czech	Republic	has	been	traditionally	defined	by	a
contest	between	the	economic	left,	represented	by	KSČM	and	ČSSD,	seeking	progressive	taxation,	increased	social
protection,	and	wider	publicly	funded	services,	and	the	economic	right,	represented	primarily	by	ODS,	espousing	to
limit	the	welfare	state,	deregulate,	and	privatise	the	economy.	Most	other	actors	of	the	political	system	found	their
place	in	this	economically	defined	space,	while	other	divides	—	such	as	over	religion,	or	over	the	legacy	of
communism	—	were	relatively	marginal	and	generally	fused	with	the	economic	cleavage.
The	current	blocks	have	little	to	do	with	economic	outlooks.	Indeed,	both	sides	include	forces	that	have	little	in
common	as	far	as	economic	programmes	are	concerned.	The	presidential	campaign	highlighted	the	hyper	increased
salience	of	identity	politics,	revolving	around	the	acceptance	of	migrant	quotas	from	the	European	Union.	While	the
Czech	Republic	effectively	did	not	accept	any	migrants	in	the	recent	migration	wave	(no	migrants	cared	to	stop	on
their	way	to	Germany),	the	political	debate	has	revolved	around	the	highly	hypothetical	question	of	migration	and	the
‘Islamisation’	of	Czech	society	(which	has	little	to	no	Muslim	population).	While	virtually	all	parties	and	both
presidential	candidates	rejected	EU	migration	quotas,	Zeman’s	supporters	tried	to	paint	Drahoš	as	a	threat	to	the
country’s	ability	to	control	migration.	One	Babiš-owned	newspaper	ran	a	story	of	a	Prague	imam	suspected	of	Syrian
terrorist	connections	three	days	before	the	second	round.
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Despite	their	uniform	rejection	of	EU	migration	quotas,	the	two	political	blocks	that	arose	from	the	2017	parliamentary
election	and	were	clarified	in	the	presidential	election	differ	in	their	approaches	to	migration	in	particular,	and	to	the
EU	in	general.	While	the	anti-Zeman	block	is	largely	pro-European	and	open	to	cooperation	on	the	migration	issue	–
the	exception	is	ODS	which	holds	a	British	Tory-inspired	Eurosceptic	line	–	the	Zeman	block	is	predominantly
Europhobic	and	staunchly	anti-migrant,	while	ANO,	true	to	its	purely	populist	character,	fudges	the	matter.
Preliminary	data	from	an	ongoing	Chapel	Hill	Expert	Survey	of	party	positions	in	the	Czech	Republic	in	2017,
summarised	in	the	figure	below,	show	that	it	is	primarily	placements	on	the	EU	and	EU	asylum	policy	that	correlate
with	partisan	endorsement	of	Zeman,	while	populism	(believing	that	‘the	people’	rather	than	politicians	should	decide
important	matters),	cultural	issues,	and	the	economy	lag	significantly	behind.
Figure	1:	Correlates	of	Zeman	support	with	party	placement	(2017)
Source:	Preliminary	Chapel	Hill	Expert	Survey	2017
Polarisation
The	crystallisation	of	two	political	blocks,	and	the	rise	of	identity	politics	focused	around	migration	and	the
acceptance	of	common	decisions	at	the	EU	level	underpin	a	creeping	polarisation	of	Czech	politics.	Identity	politics
slowly	exchanges	shades	of	grey	for	sharper	contours	of	black	and	white,	and	each	political	block	adopts	its
narrative	which	becomes	increasingly	foreign	to	the	other	side.	While	Drahoš	voters	emotionally	decry	the	victory	of
xenophobic	bumpkins,	Zeman’s	boorish	acceptance	speech,	suggesting	that	his	opponents	now	“shut	their	mouths,”
lashed	out	at	urban	liberals	and	the	media.
The	presidential	elections	suggest	that	Czech	politics	is	likely	to	take	another	step	closer	to	Poland	and	Hungary.
This	will	revolve	around	a	deepening,	identity-infused	contest	between	traditionalists	touting	their	new-found
patriotism,	and	cosmopolitans	seeking	to	maintain	the	country’s	westward	orientation.	While	this	division,	pitting
wealthier,	educated	urbanites	against	the	poorer	periphery,	is	profoundly	economic,	the	election	demonstrated	that
framing	it	in	terms	of	identity	vis-à-vis	Europe,	migration,	and	Islam,	is	much	more	effective.
Ultimately,	the	presidential	election	also	demonstrates	the	ability	of	Zeman’s	opponents	to	unite	behind	a	candidate,
and	bring	him	very	close	to	victory.	Unlike	Hungary,	the	Czech	Republic	has	been	shown	to	possess	a	liberal
opposition	that	can	propose	an	alternative	with	the	capacity	to	garner	almost	50%	of	the	vote.	The	charm	of	political
competition,	after	all,	is	that	it	requires	at	least	two	sides.	The	two	blocks	that	crystallised	in	the	presidential	election
now	form	two	opposing	groupings	in	parliament	and	in	society.	The	Zeman	block	will	likely	form	and	support	the
government,	while	the	other	block	constitutes	the	opposition.	Although	divided	by	much,	the	ability	of	the	anti-Zeman
block	to	coordinate	their	work	and	check	the	government	will	be	key	for	the	health	of	political	competition,	and	the
continuation	of	Czech	democracy.
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Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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